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Abstract 
Copyright as currently understood is justified by the belief that the protection it grants to 
creators incentivises the continued creation of works deemed culturally beneficial to 
society.  However, its use can be less altruistic, as a means of suppressing embarrassing or 
controversial information.  The ability to disseminate sensitive material quickly through the 
Internet concerns both State and non-State actors, and there are indications that through the 
use of private intermediaries, copyright can be used to suppress speech.  This article shall 
seek to explain how the current neoliberal system of governance blurs the line between public 
and private actors, creating a diffused and decentralised system of copyright enforcement that 
allows for the suppression of speech in a way that avoids discussion of censorship. 
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Introduction 
 
The regulation of the content of published and disseminated material is a constant source of 
debate and controversy throughout the world, irrespective of cultural or linguistic difference, 
governmental structure or legal system.  Questions regarding free speech and censorship on 
the Internet are not new, but constitute new facets of an on-going debate on the limits of 
expression.  Although not widely-known as a regulatory mechanism overseeing the 
boundaries of permitted and prohibited speech, one of the first tools of legal censorship over 
broadly disseminated written works was the system of copyright.  Originating in renaissance 
Europe with the invention of the printing press, the use of copyright as a means of supressing 
unfavourable speech was an explicit means of State and/or religious censorship.  However, 
copyright today is purported to exist for the protection of creative artists and the 
incentivisation of creation for the benefit of society.  Indeed, copyright is predominantly 
associated with economic issues, such as questions over the economic harm caused by 
Internet-based piracy of cultural works.  However, there is evidence to suggest that copyright 
law can be used, particularly on the Internet, to control or suppress speech by a range of State 
and non-State actors.  With the ability to disseminate material quickly over the Internet, 
potentially being able to reach a greater number of people than ever before possible and with 
fewer barriers to reproduction or dissemination, actors have been forced to respond with 
various regulatory techniques in order to suppress content deemed unfavourable.  Whereas 
this is achieved through explicit means acknowledged as forms of censorship in certain 
autocratic regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and China (Mueller 2010:10, Deibert, Palfrey, 
Rohozinski & Zittrain 2011), such active means may not fit effectively within discourses of 
Western liberal democracy; take, for example, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 
address to the Newseum in New York in 2010, where she stated that the US Government 
took the view that it is critical that Internet users are assured certain basic freedoms.  In her 
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speech, Clinton stated that blogs, emails, social networks, and text messages have opened up 
new forums for exchanging ideas, and created new targets for censorship.  Nevertheless, the 
US and others have been involved in the suppression of embarrassing and critical information, 
such as in the case of the release of diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks (an issue that shall be 
considered in greater detail at a later point in this article).  This suppression of information is 
achieved by indirect rather than direct means, in part perhaps to avoid allegations of 
censorship.  One means of achieving this indirect suppression is through the use of copyright 
law. 
 
The purpose of this article is to explore further the use of copyright law as a means of 
supressing speech on the Internet through the application of a theory of regulation that can 
aid in explaining how such use is possible.  In particular, this article seeks to demonstrate 
how neoliberalism and the associated regime of self-regulation has impacted the regulation of 
speech online in a way that requires that the traditional perception of the State as the entity 
with the power to censor be re-examined.  This article will argue that neoliberal theories have 
allowed for the suppression of speech through the twin effects of the proliferation of self- and 
intermediary-based regulation, described by some authors as ‘regulatory capitalism’, and the 
primacy of property protection as a regulatory goal (in general and within copyright law), 
which allows for the control of information through its treatment as a form of property.  
Through a process of ‘intermediarisation’ and the decentralisation of regulation, in which 
responsibility for assessing breaches of copyright and the removal of infringing content is 
held by different Internet intermediaries, State and non-State actors such as transnational 
corporations are able to suppress speech that they find embarrassing, critical or otherwise 
unfavourable, while being able to both avoid allegations of censorship and limit 
accountability.  This article shall argue that the perception of copyright as bestowing a strong 
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property right in the neoliberal tradition over created works makes enforcing copyright 
through ‘intermediarisation’ a particularly effective tool in suppressing speech.  This shall be 
done through briefly tracing the evolution of copyright law as a means of controlling 
expression, by analysing the interaction between copyright law and censorship, and by 
applying of the theory of intermediarisation to a number of case studies that demonstrate the 
usage of copyright as a means of suppressing information.  The difference between this 
approach and more traditional approaches to Internet regulation, and indeed, the original 
contribution this paper aims to make, is that while traditional analysis focuses on how 
infrastructure determines how access is permitted or restricted, either through code (Lessig 
2006) or through the creation of closed systems that offer stability in exchange for flexibility 
(Zittrain 2008), this article approaches the issue differently, assessing how a general 
regulatory theory that explains contemporary regulatory environments and relationships 
between actors can determine both infrastructure and response to regulatory challenges on the 
Internet.  Whereas the theories of Lessig and Zittrain are technology specific, the theory of 
regulatory capitalism applied is an overarching theory that can nevertheless provide insight 
into Internet-based regulation.  The originality of this article is in its assessment and 
application of this theoretical framework to the use of copyright law enforcement 
mechanisms as a way of suppressing embarrassing content.   
 
The structure of this article therefore is as follows.  The main body of the article is comprised 
of three sections.  In the first section, the theoretical underpinnings of this research are 
expanded upon, providing the frame of reference for the rest of the article.  This section shall 
both define and assess, with reference to relevant literature, the concepts of neoliberalism and 
regulatory-capitalism, and their applicability to the issue of free speech online.  The second 
section will consider the interaction between copyright and the First Amendment, detailing 
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the view of the US courts that there is little (if any) incompatibility between the two legal 
principles.  In particular, the view that the First Amendment is predominantly concerned with 
state censorship, rather than private censorship, shall be addressed.  The third section begins 
by discussing how the modern copyright system brings this perception into question, as 
copyright enforcement on the Internet has developed in such a way that it may be used for 
that purpose of private censorship through the assignment of enforcement powers to 
intermediary non-State organisations.  It shall argue that the influence of neoliberal 
conceptions of property have had a demonstrable impact on the development of copyright 
law, and how the conception of copyrighted works as a form of absolute property has resulted 
in far-reaching legislation that can impact freedom of expression.  The third section of the 
article will also consider the role of copyright as a tool of decentred censorship in more detail, 
expanding upon the findings of the second section. This section shall exemplify this 
censorship ability through three case studies demonstrating the use of copyright to censor 
material, by a State/public actor, a transnational corporation, and by individuals, all through 
the use of a private regulatory mechanism.  This final section shall demonstrate the 
importance of intermediaries in achieving this censorship, due to both the takedown of 
material under the authorisation of private actors rather than judicial authorities, and the 
difficulties in having removed content reinstated.  The article will conclude by arguing that 
the combination of regulatory capitalist systems of governance combined with a neoliberal 
conceptualisation of copyright have allowed for the use of copyright law as a decentralised 
means of suppressing unfavourable speech.  This paper shall focus in particular on the effect 
of notice and takedown requests as a means of removing content alleged to infringe copyright. 
 
Neoliberalism and regulatory capitalism: - the creation of a ‘decentralised’ regulation 
system 
USING COPYRIGHT LAW TO RESTRICT FREEDOM OF SPEECH ONLINE 7 
 
In this section, I shall demonstrate how neoliberalism and regulatory capitalism provide a 
useful framework for assessing the way in which copyright law can be used as a means of 
suppressing speech on the Internet.  There are three main ways in which regulatory capitalism 
can contribute to the study of this issue; firstly, regulatory capitalism in its encapsulation of 
decentralised, non-hierarchical and self-governing regulatory systems accurately reflects the 
decentralised nature of Internet-based regulation, and can bring new insight into existing 
theories of internet governance.  Secondly, the approach to regulation in regulatory 
capitalism as constituting relationships between informational nodes mirrors the nodal 
structure of the Internet, which ultimately constitutes a network of networks.  Finally, taking 
the view that regulatory capitalism does not stand opposed to neoliberalism as an explanation 
for the development of private and self-regulatory systems, then the regulatory capitalism 
theory may help to explain how precisely copyright as conceived as a property right can 
allow for censorship by state and non-state actors online through diffused self-regulatory 
enforcement.  In order to demonstrate how this is the case, it is necessary to expand upon the 
theory of neoliberalism, and its relation to regulatory capitalism. 
 
Neoliberalism, according to Harvey, is a theory of political economic practices that propose 
“that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximisation of entrepreneurial 
freedoms within an institutional framework characterised by private property rights…the role 
of the State is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” 
(Harvey 2007:22).  As a result of the promotion of this ideology, Harvey argues, a property 
discourse has become hegemonic.  This has largely been achieved through the dispersal of 
neoliberal thinkers throughout educational, financial, state and international institutions (such 
as the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organisation), sweeping “across the 
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world like a vast tidal wave of institutional reform” (Harvey 2007a:23).  In turn, this has had 
significant impact on political and economic thought, to the extent that neoliberalism “has 
become incorporated into the common-sense way we interpret, live in, and understand the 
world” (Harvey 2007a:23).  In terms of practical effect, neoliberalism is both a return to, and 
an expansion of, “classical liberalism, entailing limited government, unregulated free markets 
and the sanctity of private property” (Robertson 2008:27) based heavily upon the work of 
Friedrich von Hayek, author of “The Road to Serfdom” and Milton Friedman, author of 
“Capitalism and Freedom”.  
 
Whereas Hayek was much more influential in European politics, Friedman was highly 
influential in the United States, where his work in economics, particularly “Capitalism and 
Freedom”, resulted in the University of Chicago and ‘Chicago School Economics’ 
dominating US political-economic thought from the late 1970s onwards (Birch & Tickell in 
Birch and Mykhnenko 2010:50).  Through the combination of the election of the Thatcher 
and Reagan governments in the UK and US respectively, and the support of these 
governments for the policies of Hayek and Friedman, policies of “privatisation, marketization 
and deregulation have opened up the State to profit-making activities […] and lifted 
restrictions on businesses operating within and across national borders” (Cahill 2010:298).  
This process is often conceptualised through the word ‘neoliberalism’.  It is worth noting that 
privatisation refers both to the act of the state placing once-public property into the hands of 
private actors, and to the act of outsourcing traditionally public regulatory functions to 
private entitites. 
 
However, the adoption of neoliberal policies does not appear to result in a significant 
reduction in the number of regulatory institutions; instead, regulatory bodies appear to have 
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proliferated.  For this reason, Levi-Faur & Jordana (2005) and Braithwaite (2008) see 
regulatory capitalism as a critique of neoliberalism, providing explanation for the increased 
number of regulatory structures.  According to Levi-Faur & Jordana, while “conventional 
wisdom holds that we live in a neoliberal era and under neoliberal hegemony, the reality is 
significantly different and much more complex” (2005:6).  After all, it is reasoned, the prime 
motivations of neoliberalism as envisioned by thinkers such as Friedman were the shrinking 
of the state, deregulation, and the free market forming the basis of societal and economic 
relations.  Given the substantial increase in regulations and regulatory bodies since the 1980s, 
neoliberalism would appear to have failed as a doctrine.  “If we were to judge neoliberalism 
by the degree of “deregulation” it attained, it would be a failure. If we were to judge it by the 
degree of “regulation” it promoted, it would be, on its own terms, a fiasco” (Levi-Faur & 
Jordana 2005:7).  Braithwaite goes further; privatisation in the UK was combined with the 
creation of numerous regulatory bodies.  Seeing this link between proliferation of regulators 
both governmental and non-governmental in the wake of privatisations, Braithwaite states 
that neoliberalism is something of a misnomer in explaining these developments; “markets 
themselves are regulatory mechanisms, as opposed to the neoliberal schema of markets as the 
antithesis of regulation” (2008:8).  For this reason, academics such as Levi-Faur (2005) and 
Braithwaite (2008) have argued that “regulatory capitalism” is a more adequate explanation 
for contemporary regulatory structures, with Levi-Faur (2005:15) defining it as: -  
 
A distinctive order that critically differs from laissez-faire capitalism.  In regulatory 
capitalism, the state retains responsibility for steering, while business increasingly 
takes over the functions of service provision and technological innovation…(it 
entails) a restructuring of the state (through delegation and the creation of regulatory 
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agencies) and the restructuring of business…through the creation of internal controls 
and mechanisms of self-regulation. 
 
Braithwaite has theorised that since the 1980s, states have become rather more preoccupied 
with the regulation of governance structures, and less with taking a direct hand in the 
provision of that governance.  The number of non-state regulatory bodies has grown at an 
impressive rate, Braithwaite has argued, “so it is best not to conceive of the era in which we 
live as one of the regulatory state but of regulatory capitalism” (Braithwaite 2008:1). 
 
Under this theory, “markets and rule-making displace public ownership and centralised 
administration through privatisation and the growth of autonomous regulatory agencies” 
(Wright 2011:31).  Through the development of these autonomous agencies, Bevir & Rhodes 
consider that government has shifted from government of a unitary state to governance in and 
by networks (2003:1).  Lazer expands upon this conceptualisation, stating that it is no 
surprise, and indeed, not coincidental that the regulatory age overlaps with the information 
age (2005:54).  To regulate requires access to sizeable amounts of information and the ability 
to process that information.  The development and accessibility of information processing 
technologies facilitates access and utility of regulatory information.  For this reason, Lazer 
states, the role of regulators has shifted from one of “primarily being somewhat isolated 
decision makers to rich informational nodes in an international network” (2005:54).  In other 
words, regulation, and indeed regulatory capitalism, function through networks, in which 
regulation is decentralised, or in Lazer’s words, “diffused” (2005:55).  For the purposes of 
this work, the conceptualisation of regulatory capitalism as a system functioning through 
networks is a useful one.  According to Mueller, the Internet “triggers an explosion of new 
kinds of network organisation […] and […] enables a vast expansion of transnational issue 
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networks or policy networks” (2010:45).  In this way, the Internet is something of a “network 
of networks”, a network by way of its infrastructure, and by way of its regulation.  
Understood in this way, regulatory capitalism can be seen as a networked system of 
regulation, taking place within the Internet, itself a network.  In this way, it complements well 
Castells theory of the network society (2000), in which:  
 
Communication technologies, a virtually indispensible medium in our informational 
age, (are placed) at the centre of human action, which is to rely on processes enacted 
by organisational forms that are built upon networks, particularly upon information 
networks (Miard in Costigan & Perry 2012:129). 
 
The Internet is a decentralised and diffuse system that is regulated in different ways by 
different actors.  As Mueller states, “most of the real world governance of the Internet is 
decentralised and emergent: it comes from the interactions of tens of thousands of network 
operators and service providers” (2010:9).  In this way, regulation becomes diffused – not 
performed by one over-arching institution, but by and through networks of intermediaries. 
Wu considers the issue with Internet regulation to be one of increased centralisation and the 
problems associated with monopoly, with “the flow and nature of content[…]strictly 
controlled for reasons of commerce” (2010:6), and control placed in “a few hands” 
(2010:110). When assessed through the regulatory capitalism model however, a monopoly is 
not essential to restricting or suppressing content, as that control can be affected through the 
network relationships.  Or, to put it another way, the diffusion of regulatory control could 
potentially achieve the same result as monopoly regulatory control. 
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Regulatory capitalism is a useful theory that helps to explain the proliferation of decentralised, 
privately enacted regulatory structures over the past few decades, while not being 
incompatible with the general critique of neoliberalism.  Cahill is supportive of such a view, 
stating “clearly there are differences between neoliberal theory and neoliberalism in practice” 
(2010:305).  Whereas neoliberal theory considers that markets are autonomous and any state 
regulation is considered as interference or intervention, history has demonstrated that states 
have often regulated in order to ensure certain free-market ideals.  Polanyi uses the example 
of laissez faire capitalism in 19th Century England, which was presumed to be a time of 
minimal regulation or state interference, when in fact the state was involved in continuous, 
centrally organised and controlled interventionism (Polanyi, as cited in Cahill 2010:306).  In 
contrast to regulatory capitalism thinkers, Cahill suggests that we consider neoliberalism in 
terms of “actually existing neoliberalism”, which corresponds closely with neoliberal theory 
while recognising that the neoliberal ideal of the small state has not been eventuated (Cahill 
2010:306-307).  Harvey maintains that this is to be expected; the neoliberal project relies 
upon state action to ensure neoliberal goals are met, creating “the paradox of intense state 
interventions and government by elites and ‘experts’ in a world where the state is supposed 
not to be interventionist” (2007b:69).  Businesses and corporations often work closely with 
governments, setting the terms and conditions of regulatory and self-regulatory systems, with 
legislators producing legislation and regulatory frameworks favourable to particular 
businesses or industries (2007b:76-77).  In this way, the interests of state and corporation are 
aligned – in actually existing neoliberalism, state and market are mutually reinforcing, rather 
than opposed.  As shall be demonstrated, the state and market may not be opposed, but align, 
when considering the suppression of speech through copyright law.  Wu and Goldsmith, for 
example, have considered predominantly the role of the state in Internet regulation, and the 
impact of territoriality in regulating the Internet along national jurisdictions (2006), referring 
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to how “governments control behaviour not individually, but collectively, through 
intermediaries” (2006:68).  However, it is not only governments that are able to exercise this 
ability to control power through intermediaries; other non-state actors within the network are 
also able to exert this influence.  Furthermore, whereas Goldsmith and Wu posit that the 
Internet is a sphere in which government and market are in conflict (see, for example 
2006:29-30), with one seeking to regulate and the other seeking to avoid regulation, the 
regulatory capitalism approach would suggest that both “market” and “state” can be aligned 
in seeking regulatory approaches. 
 
Cahill posits two main ways in which regulatory capitalism is used to ensure neoliberal ends; 
the first is that there has been a significant process of marketization and privatisation, 
particularly of social services.  Although they are subject to some form of regulation, the 
provision of the service is performed by the private entity rather than the state.  Cahill reasons 
that “neoliberal theory has provided a convenient rationale and justification for such policies” 
based on the idea that the state is an inefficient provider of certain services, which the market 
is much better able to provide (Cahill 2010:307).  Secondly, Cahill states that this “actually 
existing neoliberalism” has facilitated a greater marketization of life, in which an increased 
number of services, such as childcare provision and education funding are provided by 
private, self-regulating entities, “in keeping with the neoliberal argument that markets are the 
most moral and efficient means of economic organisation and […] should be the primary 
mechanism through which individuals source their wants and needs” (Cahill 2010:308).  
Cahill goes on to state that while there may have been an increase in legislation and 
regulation, it “has been used to secure the formal freedoms advocated by neoliberal 
polemicists” (Cahill 2010:308).  This would appear to be in line with Harvey’s argument that 
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despite neoliberalism’s ‘small-state’ theoretical basis, neoliberalism in fact relies upon state 
intervention in order to achieve its aims. 
 
There is indeed evidence to suggest this is the case.  Numerous writers on the topic of 
regulation (Shamir 2011, Ogus 1995, Scholte 1997 and Jessop 1997 to name but a few) 
express a certain cynicism over whether regulatory regimes control private companies, or 
private companies control the regulatory regime, particularly with regard to private self-
regulation.  Ogus for example argues that from the early 1980s onwards, the UK was (and is) 
seen as a “bastion” of self-regulation (1995:97), and that fitting with the neoliberal dynamic, 
the perception is that self-regulation is cheaper and more effective than public regulation, and 
addresses a “market failure” of information asymmetry, in which private enterprises better 
understand their business than public regulators (1995:97-98).  However, as Ogus goes on to 
note, “private interests that are threatened by regulation may gain considerable benefits if 
they are allowed themselves to formulate and enforce the relevant controls” (1994:98).  
Culpepper (2010) in particular has researched this issue extensively, determining that where 
private actors work in areas of low political saliency (i.e. issues that are not particularly 
mediatised and unlikely to be ‘vote winners’ in elections, such as corporate directorship), 
often those private interests are able to direct legislation and/or regulation in a way that suits 
their business interests in a way that Culpepper refers to as ‘Quiet Politics’ (see Culpepper 
2010:5-23 for more information).  As will be demonstrated in later sections, this perception 
appears relevant and applicable to the case of Internet intermediaries that take on regulatory 
functions – to give but one example at this stage, MacKinnon argues that “the geopolitical 
power of corporations has been growing for decades…the conventional power politics of 
nation-states is disrupted by the emerging power of the private sector […] Internet-related 
companies are even more powerful because not only do they create and sell products, but 
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they also provide and shape the digital spaces upon which citizens increasingly depend” 
(2012:10-11).  For this reason, I feel that regulatory capitalism theory is not entirely 
inconsistent with analysis of neoliberalism, and is a useful way of considering the way in 
which copyright law is used as a means of censorship.  Nevertheless, before applying these 
theories to the issue of online censorship through copyright law, however, it is useful to 
consider beforehand the traditional perception of the role of copyright in censorship, the 
interaction between the First Amendment and copyright, and the inbuilt protections afforded 
to users of copyrighted work found in the doctrine of fair use. 
 
Copyright as the engine of expression, or copyright as the suppressor of expression? 
 
The focus of this analysis of “censorship”, or rather, suppression, is limited to cases in which 
the documents under discussion contain information that one party wishes to remain 
confidential, but nevertheless may be subject to a public interest defence under fair use.  In 
this respect, and as shall be demonstrated, both the ability and desire to “censor” in this 
manner may be on the part of a state or non-state actor, who works through an intermediary 
in order to suppress that speech.  The First Amendment states that: -  
 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of 
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.” 
 
In this respect, the First Amendment is considered as applying to the US government, and not 
private actors.  The judiciary of the United States does not appear favourably predisposed to 
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the argument that copyright can be used as a means of suppressing speech.  Birnhack has 
gone as far as to state that the US courts’ systematic rejections of a conflict between 
copyright law and freedom of expression constitute a “denial of the conflict” (2002-
2003:1282), and Pollack refers to concerns being “brushed away” (2004:32).  In the 
important (and indeed, controversial) decision Eldred v Ashcroft (2003), the US Supreme 
Court ruled that a challenge made by a private actor to a change in copyright law by Congress 
could not be made on the basis of the First Amendment.  The challenge was brought by 
Eldred (and other petitioners), who runs Eldritch Press.  Eldritch Press is a non-commercial 
enterprise offering public domain works in digital formats on the Internet.  The petition 
argued that the recently adopted Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) was unconstitutional, 
as the Act extended the term of copyright protection for twenty years (the life of the author 
plus 70 years, increased from life plus 50), for both existing and new works (Birnhack 2002-
2003:1275).  In addition arguing on the basis of the ‘limited time’ provision of the ‘Copyright 
Clause’ of the US Constitution (Article 1, S.8), Eldred raised a second argument on the basis 
that the CTEA as a content neutral form of regulation of speech failed to comply with the 
protection of speech provided for by the First Amendment (Eldred v Ashcroft 2003:2).  
Content-neutral regulation is regulation that does not discriminate on the basis of the content 
of the speech; examples provided by Netanel include, for example, decibel limits on rock 
concerts or permitting broadcasting only within certain frequencies set forth in a Federal 
Communications Commission license (2008:118).  Eisgruber argues that as copyright 
protection does not appear to discriminate based on viewpoint or content, even if changes to 
copyright laws are unwise, they should not necessarily be subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny (2003:21).  The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion.  In the majority 
opinion given by Justice Ginsburg, it was stated that the Court rejected First Amendment 
scrutiny of “a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and 
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safeguards” (Eldred v Ashcroft 2003:28), reiterating an earlier statement from Harper & Row 
(1985) that copyright is the engine of free-expression (Eldred v Ashcroft 2003:28-29).  
Eisgruber agrees, stating that “copyright is not censorious […it] does not pick and choose 
among ideas and subject-matters” (2003:18).  This was a view reiterated by the Supreme 
Court in the case of Golan v Holder (2012), where it ruled, “by establishing a marketable 
right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and 
disseminate ideas” (2012:23-24).  However, this may be brought into question where the use 
of copyright is to prevent rather than promote dissemination, as shall be expanded upon in the 
next section of this article. 
 
Birnhack reasons that this view held by the Supreme Court can be seen in its reference to “the 
common history of copyright and the First Amendment…(and) to their common goal” (2002-
2003:1280).  In Eldred v Ashcroft, the Court declared that “the Copyright Clause and First 
Amendment were adopted close in time.  This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, 
copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles” (Eldred v 
Ashcroft 2003:28).  This is indicative of a view that copyright and the First Amendment are 
not only compatible, but work harmoniously, with the First Amendment “removing obstacles 
to the free flow of ideas, [and] copyright adding positives incentives to encourage the flow” 
(Birnhack 2002-2003:1286).  Nimmer argues that the conventional view is that supporting 
copyright and opposing censorship appear to go hand in hand, and are mutually supportive 
rather than contradictory (1969-1970:1180-1181).  Preceding analysis by the Courts, Nimmer 
appears to predict somewhat the reasoning of the Courts when arguing that in general, 
copyright’s incentivisation of the dissemination of knowledge “comports” with freedom of 
speech (1969-1970:1191).  Even if copyright has some ability to restrict free speech through 
preventing others from copying one’s expression of an idea wholesale, it is “far out-balanced 
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by the public benefit that accrues through copyright encouragement of creativity” (Nimmer 
1969-1970:1192).  Pollack expands upon this, arguing that the fact that the Copyright Clause 
was intended only to promote progress (argued by Pollack as being the dissemination of 
knowledge) and was not aligned with censorship, explaining why the Drafters’ did not 
acknowledge any incompatibility between it and the First Amendment (2004:29).  Indeed, 
whereas the First Amendment guaranteed the freedom of speech, copyright would ensure the 
dissemination of that speech (2004:30).  In this way, copyright as established in the US 
Constitution differed significantly from ‘pre-modern’ copyright, insofar as ‘pre-modern’ 
copyright was explicitly a tool of censorship (Cotter 2003:324-325, Wittecombe 2004:59, 
Green & Karolides 2011:111).  Cotter writes that, “in England, the interests of church and 
state in censoring dangerous ideas, and of the printers and publishers of suppressing 
competition, coalesced in the development of a quasi-copyright regime that persisted until the 
18th Century” (2003:326).  By focusing on those with the power to disseminate information, 
rather than those who were able to produce that information, the State was much more able to 
effectively censor messages. This close relationship between publishers and the State was 
mutually beneficial; according to Patterson, “by promoting censorship and press control the 
stationers were utilising the best means available to protect their “property”.  The government 
was not really interested in copyright as property, only as an instrument of censorship” 
(Patterson & Lindberg 1991:26). 
 
In comparison, in the 18th Century, it was the work of Adam Smith and John Locke on the 
importance of personal property, liberty and the pursuit of learning that became influential 
(Deazley 2004:1-13), with these works influencing the development of a copyright based on 
the dissemination of knowledge (Spitzlinger 2011:273), and therefore a copyright which the 
Drafters considered compatible with free speech.  Copyright was no longer an explicit means 
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of state censorship but a tool for economic development and the exchange of ideas (Cotter 
2003:328).  For this reason, the First Amendment and copyright could be seen to be 
compatible, so long as the government did not explicitly interfere.  Indeed, government 
appears to be the particular focus of the First Amendment, as is evidenced in the literature.  
Netanel describes freedom of expression as secured “most basically by constitutional 
constraints on the state’s censorial power” (2008:35), and Eisgruber states that “most of free 
speech law rests on a concern about censorship…on a judgement that government ought not 
to prohibit the dissemination of ideas because it deems them wrong or harmful” (2003:18).  
With this in mind, the Supreme Court in Eldred v Ashcroft stated that copyright has ‘built-in’ 
First Amendment protection, particularly through the doctrine of fair use (Eldred v Ashcroft 
2003:29, reiterating earlier statements in the case of Harper & Row v Nation Enterprises 
from 1985, and reiterated in Golan v Holder (2012) at p.24).  With regard to the possibility of 
private actors having the potential to censor, Birnhack argues that the view of the courts is 
that the doctrine of fair use can perform a First Amendment function (2002-2003:1290).  The 
fair use doctrine is laid out in 17 USC §107, in which it is stated that the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies for purposes such as 
criticism is not an infringement of copyright.  This is subject to four factors being considered, 
namely the purpose of the use of the work, the nature of the work copied, the amount of the 
work used and the effect on the potential market for the work.  For example, in the case of 
Rosemont Enterprises v Random House Inc (1966), the notorious tycoon Howard Hughes 
sought to block the publication of a biography by John Keats, on the basis that its reliance on 
portions of a series of articles known as ‘The Howard Hughes Story’, was an infringement of 
copyright (1966:paragraph 1).  Evidence suggests that Hughes’ use of copyright as a means 
of blocking publication was intended specifically as a means of preventing information from 
becoming public, including the allegation that Hughes specifically purchased the copyright 
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over the series of articles solely for the purpose of bringing the lawsuit (1966:paragraphs 5-8, 
49).  The Court of Appeal stated that fair use was a “privilege in others than the owner of a 
copyright to use copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent” 
(1966:paragraph 14), and that in this case, the public interest served by the biography 
outweighed Hughes’ desire for privacy (it is worth noting that this common law approach to 
fair use predates the current approach, laid down in the 1976 Copyright Act mentioned 
earlier).  For this reason, Keats could rely on fair use of the copyrighted material in order to 
publish the biography.  In the case of Harper & Row v Nation Enterprises (1985) however, it 
was held that the publication of sections of Gerald Ford’s unpublished manuscript by The 
Nation magazine in such a way as to ‘scoop’ an article appearing in The Times did not 
constitute fair use.  The fact that the use of the work was for commercial purposes and 
intended to pre-empt publication by another magazine (1985:paragraphs 32-33), that the 
manuscript was currently unpublished but subject to contract for publication 
(1985:paragraphs 34-36), that the article took only 13% of the manuscript but was almost 
entirely based around that 13% that the courts considered some of the most important work in 
the manuscript (1985:paragraphs 37-39) and that the publication significantly impacted upon 
the marketability of the manuscript subject to a contract with another publisher 
(1985:paragraphs 40-42) meant that a claim of fair use was negated.  With regard to the 
relationship between fair use and the First Amendment, the Court stated that First 
Amendment protections were “already embodied in the Copyright Act's…latitude for 
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use” (1985:paragraph 28).  Eisgruber 
comments on this fact that yet another reason why copyright should not be subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny is that fair use affords “speakers protections comparable to those 
recommended by the First Amendment itself” (2003:24).  In this respect then, the legal 
position appears to be that the First Amendment protects from governmental censorship (the 
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government being the body most able to censor or suppress speech), whereas fair use 
performs the same function within copyright with respect to private actors.  
 
Regulatory capitalism and the private enforcement of copyright: - sidestepping the First 
Amendment, silencing fair use? 
 
It is submitted that it is here that the theory of regulatory capitalism becomes useful in 
demonstrating how copyright can be used as a means of suppressing speech.  The traditional 
analysis of the ability to use copyright as a means of censoring content has primarily been 
undertaken (particularly by the courts) using a state-centred approach, in which the 
perception is that it is the State that has the power to censor, or perhaps more aptly, the power 
to regulate (as evidenced by the analysis in the previous section).  However, in discussions of 
the regulation of copyright on the Internet, this state-centred approach is not particularly 
useful, or enlightening, and reflective of a traditional view of the state as regulator, rather 
than the model of regulatory capitalism, in which regulation is diffused and regulators are 
decentralised networks of actors.  This traditional approach can be seen in the case of CBS v 
Democratic National Committee (1973), in which it was stated that “Congress appears to 
have concluded[...]that of these two choices-private or official censorship-Government 
censorship would be the most pervasive, the most self-serving, the most difficult to restrain 
and hence the one most to be avoided” (1973:105).  This would suggest that there is a 
difference in the ability of private and “official” actors to censor, and that both state and 
private sector are distinct in this respect.  Instead, what we have seen since the late 1990s is 
the de-centring of regulation and regulatory institutions, and the delegation of these powers to 
private institutions.  As goes the theory of regulatory capitalism, governments devolve the 
power to regulate to private bodies in a form of ‘self-regulation’, predominantly on the 
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neoliberal principle that the private entities are more effectively able to regulate than the 
government itself.  With regard to copyright enforcement on the Internet, these powers have 
been devolved to Internet intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers and content-
hosting platforms such as YouTube, who effectively self-regulate by removing infringing 
content.  In this way, the regulation of copyright in the online environment has moved from 
state-centred public enforcement, to decentred private enforcement through networks of 
actors.  This would appear to fit within the framework of regulatory capitalism as described 
in the first section of this article. 
 
With regard to copyright enforcement, this is made possible through legislation such as the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the US, and the E-Commerce Directive 
(Directive 2000/31/EC) in the EU.  A framework has been created in which the removal of 
content from the Internet is not subject to judicial oversight, but only requires requests from 
right holders.  This is through the creation of a ‘notice and takedown’ system for regulating 
copyright infringement online.  This legislation in effect outsources the enforcement of 
copyright online from state actors to private enterprises – in this instance, Internet 
intermediaries.  In the US, this power is to be found in s.512 DMCA, relating to the liability 
of service providers online.  Section 512 states that a service provider shall not be deemed 
liable for copyright infringement for material transferred through the Internet connection or 
stored on a computer system, so long as they remove or restrict access to the infringing 
content on a request from the copyright holder.  In the E-commerce Directive, for the 
purposes of looking at the role of intermediaries, Article 14 is most relevant, as it details the 
rights and liabilities of content hosting providers.  Article 14 states that an information 
society service that consists of the storage on information provided by a recipient of that 
service will not be liable for infringement for information held on that service so long as the 
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provider had no actual knowledge of the infringement, and upon being made aware of the 
infringement, “acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information”.  This 
means that these service providers are immunised from lawsuits so long as they respond to 
notices of claimed takedown requests, “and so providers take-down to avoid the risks of suit, 
even if they would have faced no liability” (Seltzer 2011:3).  Thus forms one type of Internet-
based regulatory mechanism that can be explained through regulatory capitalism: - legislation 
is passed which imposes a regulatory role upon the providers of information hosting services, 
in exchange for immunity from suit so long as that regulation is performed.  The regulators 
are private, non-governmental enterprises functioning autonomously within networks, with 
little if any governmental oversight.  This regulation, referring back to the analysis in the first 
section of this article, works through a decentralised network of nodes – intermediary content 
hosts constitute one node within this network, and the node that ultimately makes the 
decision to remove content, whereas other nodes include the uploader of such content, and 
the entity that makes a copyright infringement claim constituting another inter-relational node.  
As Mueller states, “the Internet disperses to millions of private actors the capability to 
manage and control their own devices and conditions under which they access other networks.  
It not only makes everyone a potential publisher, it also makes every person a potential 
censor” (2010:187).  Through this decentralised means of regulating copyright enforcement, 
it becomes possible for private censorship to be fostered, as shall be demonstrated by the 
following case studies.  In such a system the judicial conception of the state being the entity 
most able to censor, as indicated in the CBS case, does not appear to reflect well the 
contemporary decentralised regulatory system for notice-and-takedown.  The relationship is 
not between public censor and private entity censored, but a multilateral relationship, in 
which either the state or a private entity can have content removed from the Internet via an 
intermediary actor.  With the final decision being made by that intermediary actor, on the 
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basis of a request by a state or non-state actor, private acts of suppression appear as effective 
as state-based acts.  The following examples seek to show how the regulatory capitalism 
approach to nodal regulation allows for suppression through copyright infringement 
accusations, and how this is action that can be taken by both state and non-state actors. 
 
In 2010, it was alleged that Bradley Manning, a Private in the US Military, leaked sensitive 
information to WikiLeaks, an organisation self-described as a publisher of classified 
information believed to be in the public interest.  The information allegedly passed to 
WikiLeaks by Manning included over 251,827 diplomatic cables and 8000 State Department 
‘directives’ detailing the opinions of US diplomats regarding certain nations, world leaders 
and other government officials (Welch 2010), revealing potentially embarrassing comments 
made by official representatives of the US in foreign nations.  These cables were released in 
2010, along with other sensitive military files such as a video clip showing a US military 
helicopter firing upon civilians in Iraq with the crew “falsely claiming to have encountered a 
firefight […] and then laughing at the dead after launching the airstrike” (McGreal 2010).  
These leaks proved highly frustrating to the US military and government, who considered 
them to be a threat to national security (McGreal 2010).  The sensitive files were allegedly 
passed to WikiLeaks, an online host of classified information nevertheless believed to be in 
the public interest, by US Private Bradley Manning.  WikiLeaks then worked with several 
newspapers, including The New York Times and The Guardian to search through the cables 
for information that may be considered to be essential for the public to know.  The US 
Government was horrified by the release of this information, and began to apply political 
pressure to organisations associated with WikiLeaks in order to isolate them politically, 
financially and technologically.  For example, VISA and Mastercard suspended all payments 
to the WikiLeaks website owners (McCullagh 2010) and PayPal announced that it was 
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suspending the account used for redirecting funds to WikiLeaks.  However most interestingly, 
and indeed most worryingly, when WikiLeaks attempted to host its data on Amazon’s servers 
after repeated distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks rendered its own server unusable, 
after an aide to Senator Joe Lieberman started making enquiries into Amazon’s support for 
WikiLeaks (Vance 2010), Amazon removed the WikiLeaks data from its servers.  Denying 
that this was a result of political pressure, Amazon claimed the content was removed for a 
breach of Amazon’s terms of service, publicly stating “there have been reports that a 
government inquiry prompted us not to serve WikiLeaks any longer.  That is inaccurate […] 
it's clear that WikiLeaks doesn't own or otherwise control all the rights to this classified 
content” (Beschizza 2010).  In other words, Amazon justified the removal of the cables from 
its servers on the grounds that they constituted an infringement of copyright, as WikiLeaks 
did not hold the ‘rights’ to the content – something that is highly questionable, as according 
to 17 USC §105, copyright protection is not available for works created by the United States 
Government.  Yet Amazon specifically stated that hundreds of people store all sorts of 
content on their servers, and that “some of this data is controversial, and that’s perfectly fine.  
But, when companies or people go about securing and storing large quantities of data that 
isn’t rightfully theirs[…]it’s a violation of our terms of service, and folks need to go operate 
elsewhere.” (Amazon:Message 65348).  This appears to indicate that the justification for 
removing the content was as much about copyright as it was about the sensitivity of the data.  
Amazon performed an act of self-regulation in response to a political situation, perhaps to 
avoid being regulated by a state actor – while the controversy relating to the cables had to do 
with the distribution of confidential (and embarrassing) material, it was ‘ownership’ or ‘rights’ 
over information that was contested.  Through this nodal relationship of power, embarrassing 
content was removed, in a manner compatible with a regulatory capitalism approach.  If we 
return to Eisgruber’s earlier statement, that government ought not to suppress speech because 
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it criticises government or politicians, or is subversive, then if the government had explicitly 
suppressed the Wikileaks cables, then arguably a First Amendment challenge could have 
been made.  However, in this instance, content was removed from Amazon servers on the 
basis of copyright infringement.  While copyright in itself may not discriminate on the basis 
of viewpoint or content, in this instance, it is likely that the sensitivity of the documents 
involved was at the heart of the content removal, rather than a desire to protect copyrights.  In 
other words, it is arguable that it is the content of the cables that was the focus of removal, 
rather than a content-neutral removal of infringing material.  Through the decentralisation of 
copyright regulation, and the enforcement capabilities placed in the hands of an intermediary 
(in this case Amazon by virtue of its position as content host), the suppression of information 
deemed damaging to a government can be suppressed through the subversive use of 
copyright, rather than the overt use of governmental demand for removal; in this way “the 
mechanics of copyright today are the same as when copyright was used as a device of public 
censorship” (Patterson 2000-2001:239). 
 
Other examples of such potential acts of censorship exist, in which the State has no direct or 
indirect involvement.  In 2005, analysts from Citigroup wrote a report called ‘Plutonomy: - 
Buying Luxury, Explaining Global Imbalances’.  In 2006, a second report, ‘Plutonomy: - The 
Rich Getting Richer’ was written.  These two reports detailed the income inequalities rising 
in the world, expressing views that cast Citigroup in a bad light, presenting a company 
unconcerned with, and even appearing to revel in inequality, in addition to demonstrating a 
certain amount of hubris.  For example, one of the memos stated “we think the rich are likely 
to get even wealthier in the coming years.  Implication 2: - we like companies that sell to or 
service the rich – luxury goods, private banks etc” (Kapur 2006), and in discussion of 
workers (dubbed ‘the masses’ in the memo), that “Capitalists (the rich) get an even bigger 
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share of GDP as a result, principally, of globalization…good for the wealth of capitalists, 
relatively bad for developed market unskilled/outsource-able labor.  We expect our 
Plutonomy basket of stocks […] to continue performing well in future” (Kapur 2006).  
Citigroup was one investment firm that required a bailout from the US Government, to the 
tune of $25 billion in October 2008, followed by an additional $20 billion in the following 
month (McDermind 2008).  Understandably, when the memos were leaked onto the Internet 
in 2009, they caused a considerable amount of outrage amongst ‘netizens’ who shared the 
memos; the general public had now in effect bailed out a company that had appeared to 
demonstrate such contempt for that same public.  Citigroup, rather than denying the 
authenticity of the memos, instead attempted to remove them from the Internet.  One blog, 
Political Gates, which documents political scandals, has a page dedicated to attempts by 
Citigroup to suppress the memos (Patrick 2011).  In particular, it notes that Scribd, a website 
used to host documents has been subject to repeated takedown notices by lawyers 
representing Citigroup.  For example, if an Internet user attempts to access one Scribd page 
on which one of the memos was uploaded (http://www.scribd.com/word/removal/6674234), 
the user is met with a message stating “This content was removed at the request of Kilpatrick 
Townsend & Stockton LLP”.  In fact, the number of takedown notices was so substantial that 
documents that appear to be one of the Citigroup memos are now automatically removed by 
Scribd’s automated copyright protection system.  Files uploaded that appear to be the same as 
the CitiGroup memos are rejected, with Scribd generating an upload error on the basis that 
they “appear very similar to an unauthorized copyrighted document that was previously 
removed from Scribd” (see www.scribd.com/word/removal/23321255).  The error message 
does however state that if the automated takedown was made in error, the uploader can 
contact Scribd to report the error (although no guarantee is made that the content will be 
reuploaded).   
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This example provides some interesting points for discussion, and once again demonstrate 
how through decentralised regulation, promoted through a regulatory capitalism framework, 
help to allow for private censorship in a way that perhaps was not foreseen by Courts stating 
the compatibility of the First Amendment and copyright.  Furthermore, it also brings into 
question the effectiveness of the ‘built-in’ First Amendment protection to be found in fair use.  
The Citigroup example once again demonstrates suppression on the grounds of copyright 
infringement, in which enforcement (by means of takedown) is performed by a private entity.  
In some ways, this case would appear to share similarities with the previously discussed 
Random House case.  As was stated earlier, Hughes intention in bringing an action for 
copyright infringement was intended to suppress information that Hughes did not want made 
public.  In the judgement, Chief Judge Lumbard made the observation that Hughes’s demand 
for an injunction could not be granted, as he did not come to the Court with clean hands. 
Lumbard stated that “has never been the purpose of the copyright laws to restrict the 
dissemination of information about persons in the public eye even though those concerned 
may not welcome the resulting publicity” (Rosemont Enterprises v Random House Inc 
1966:paragraph 36).  Lumbard went on to state that “the spirit of the First Amendment” 
applies to copyright insofar as courts should not allow for interference with the general 
public’s right to be informed of matters of general interest “when anyone seeks to use the 
copyright statute which was designed to protect interests of quite a different nature” 
(1966:paragraph 37).  Arguably, the motivation of Citigroup is similar – copyright is not 
being protected so as to ensure that Citigroup is able to benefit through the dissemination of 
their work, but instead used as a means of suppressing the release of embarrassing 
information.  Arguably, this case could be distinguished from that of Harper & Row; in that 
case, the Court determined that the actions by The Nation did not constitute fair use.  
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However, in this case, an argument of fair use could potentially be raised.  To begin with, the 
release of the memos was not for commercial purposes, but to instead raise awareness of the 
actions of Citigroup.  The market value of the memos for Citigroup itself is debatable, as 
given the interest in their suppression it could be argued that they were more valuable to 
Citigroup unpublished.  While the work had not been previously released, it is arguable that 
the release of the memo, and the criticisms raised regarding Citigroup’s conduct could have 
been found to be in the public interest in a manner similar to Random House.  Furthermore, 
17 USC §107 states that the fact that a work is not published will not in itself prejudice a 
finding of fair use, particularly in light of the other criteria.  While it was stated in Eldred v 
Ashcroft that the First Amendment and fair use protection are not as strong when making 
“other people’s speeches” (2003:31), namely by reproducing the work of another author, the 
uploading of the entirety of the memos for the purposes of criticism and review should at 
least be analysed (or capable of analysis) within the context of fair use by the Courts.  As 
Gordon states, when it comes to the “hostile use” of another’s work (in this case, the memos), 
in order to subject them to criticism or negative review, the user is “unlikely to obtain 
permission from the prior author” (1990:1033).  Indeed, as Gordon goes on to state, “a 
speaker sometimes needs to use the expressions […] that represent what he is attempting to 
rebut […] or criticise in order to make his point clearly” (1990:1034).  This is particularly the 
case with the memos – if only extracts were provided, the uploader could be accused of 
presenting quotes out of context.  In order for the full import of the memos to be understood, 
the entirety would need to be presented.  For these reasons, fair use analysis would be 
essential.  However, with decentred enforcement of copyright, this analysis does not appear 
possible.  This is because fair use is only a defence to infringement, meaning that an action 
for infringement must be brought against a defendant before fair use analysis can proceed 
(Lessig 2004:97-99).  However, the way in which notice and takedown works under the 
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DMCA and E-Commerce Directive means that no judicial intervention is necessary – the 
intermediary is informed by the right-holder that a particular file infringes on copyright, and 
the file is then removed by that content host.  Through the privatisation of copyright 
enforcement, the ability for the courts to intervene and perform a fair use analysis appears to 
be significantly curtailed.  If a fair use defence cannot be raised, and the Supreme Court has 
determined that copyright cannot be challenged under the First Amendment, then this gives 
significant room for private actors to suppress information contrary to their interests.  In 
particular, the use of automated takedowns results in a scenario in which “code is law” 
(Lessig 2006).  Lessig theorises that the role that code plays in Internet regulation will result 
in a shift in the way that copyright is protected.  “Code can, and increasingly will, displace 
law as the primary defence of intellectual property in cyberspace.  Private fences, not public 
law” (2006:175).  This appears to be in line with the Citigroup example – an automated 
takedown/removal process is used to protect the memos, resulting in there being no need for 
legal action on Citigroup’s part in order for the memos to be removed from the server.  As 
there is no need for legal action, fair use cannot be raised as a defence.  Because no defence 
can be raised, and because code is used to automatically remove information deemed as 
infringing on copyright, the ability of private citizens to censor through the use of 
intermediaries is significantly increased.  As Patterson warned, “recall that copyright is a 
monopoly and that one of the factors of a monopoly is the right of the monopolist to control 
access” (Patterson 2000-2001:237). 
 
That both examples deal with confidential information not intended for public release does 
not impact upon the potential public interest in those documents being released for the 
purposes of critique, and at least eligible for consideration under fair use.  In the case of Open 
Policy Group v Diebold (2004), confidential and private emails between employees of 
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Diebold concerning irregularities with the machines used for voting in elections were leaked 
by an unknown source.  These leaked emails were then uploaded to a number of websites, 
including that of the Open Policy Group.  In order to suppress this information, Diebold sent 
notice-and-takedown requests to the intermediaries hosting or linking to these emails 
(Netanel 2008:115) – all complied, with the exception of Open Policy Group’s.  Judge Fogel, 
presiding, was very critical of Diebold’s actions, stating that “the email archive was 
posted[…]for the purpose of informing the public about the problems associated with 
Diebold’s electronic voting machines. It is hard to imagine a subject the discussion of which 
could be more in the public interest” (OPG v Diebold 2004:10).  Similarities can be seen 
between this case and the Wikileaks and Citigroup cases – in one, the purpose of the 
disclosure was to expose the perceived misdoings of the US government, and in the second, 
the inner workings of a company that received a substantial amount of public funds in order 
to keep the company afloat.  Furthermore, Judge Fogel made additional points that have been 
argued earlier in this work – that the purpose of Diebold’s actions was to use copyright “as a 
sword to suppress the publication of embarrassing content” (2004:13), rather than protect a 
commercial interest in copyright, as Diebold had no intention of publishing this information 
itself.  Instead, copyright was being used to prevent publication.  Judge Fogel argued that this 
information was without doubt in the public interest, and copyright could not be used to 
prevent the publication of this information for the purposes of critique.  Arguably, similar 
findings could be made in the Wikileaks and Citigroup cases, should they have been in a 
position to argue a fair-use defence. 
 
A final example pertains to the 2008 US Presidential Elections.  In February 2008, YouTube 
removed a campaign video by John McCain ostensibly following a request by Warner Bros, 
on the basis that it used the song ‘Can’t Take My Eyes Off You’ (Modine 2008).  According 
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to technology website The Register, by October 2008, McCain had experienced several 
YouTube campaign videos being removed on copyright grounds.  The McCain campaign 
team became so frustrated that they sent a letter to YouTube, stating that the site is too quick 
to remove videos on copyright grounds, “based on overreaching copyright claims” (Modine 
2008).  According to the same source, the Obama campaign also suffered from repeated 
YouTube takedown requests based on allegations of copyright infringement.  In ‘Access 
Controlled’ (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski & Zittrain 2010), it is theorised that “given the 
rapid-fire nature of political campaigns, the 14 business days it can take to restore a video to 
YouTube may effectively constitute censorship” (2010:79-80).  While it may be the case that 
some of the claims may have been in some way legitimate (although questionable under fair 
use), it is altogether too likely that at least some of the takedown requests may have been 
made by members of the opposite campaign group, or individual supporters of either 
candidate, in order to harm the chances of their political opposition.  Access Controlled 
concurs with this view, stating, “it seems likely that we will see political rivals attempt to 
disable each other’s online speech using spurious copyright claims” (2010:80).  In this final 
example, the primacy granted to ‘property’ over ‘political expression’ is indicative of another 
way in which the decentred enforcement of copyright built upon the regulatory capitalism 
framework can potentially lead to private acts of censorship.  In discussions regarding the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in Eldred v Reno (which lead to Eldred v Ashcroft at the 
Supreme Court), Patterson stated somewhat critically that the courts had not only accepted, 
but reaffirmed, publishers’ arguments that copyright is a form of “garden-variety property 
[…] moreover, copyright is treated as being as the top of the hierarchy of private property” 
(Patterson 2000-2001:227).  Birnhack similarly believes that this conceptualisation of 
copyright as property is intimated in the Eldred v Ashcroft decision (2002-2003:1327).  This 
view of copyright as property, it is submitted, is based in neoliberal economic theory, and 
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reflective of the importance placed on property rights more generally.  As previously stated, a 
significant component of neoliberal theory is the increased marketization of life, with the 
prime role of the state being the protection of property rights.  Increased protection of 
creative works, it is reasoned, would provide wealth not only for the creators of works, but 
also for society in a form of ‘trickle down’ effect – “neoliberalism valorised property which 
was used in the production of goods and services for sale in the market” (Robertson 
2008:218), and through this commodification of creativity, greater general prosperity could 
be assured, given the neoliberal theory that the best way of distributing that product to the 
populace would be for intellectual property to be valorised as private property, thereby 
becoming more marketable.  In support of this view is Tyfield, who argues that with the crisis 
in industrial profitability of the 1970s, capital started finding new areas in which to invest, in 
particular finance, services and “cultural industries” (Tyfield in Birch & Mykhnenko 
2010:61).   
 
Yet what does the adoption of a neoliberal conception of copyright mean for the suppression 
of speech online?  According to some authors (Zimmerman 1986, Buskirk 1992, Samuelson 
2002-2003) although there may not be an intent upon the part of nations and governments to 
create a copyright regime that may allow for censorship, increasingly they privilege these 
property rights to a degree that could foster censorship.  For if the copyright holders “are 
allowed absolute control over the context in which (works) are reproduced, they will also be 
allowed a form of veto power over criticism by being able to withhold the object of 
interpretation” (Buskirk 1992:93).  In this respect, the treatment of copyright as giving a 
strong property right allows right-holders (and potentially, non right-holders) the ability to 
control use of a copyrighted work as if it were the personal property of the complainant.  
With regard to the previously mentioned Citigroup memos, it meant that the memos could be 
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treated as personal property, and removed from the Scribd server, and in this instance, 
political ads removed from YouTube because of the use of music within those ads.  Or, as 
Patterson put it, “to view copyright as protecting property is to subject its regulatory aspects 
to proprietary concepts and thus to minimise, if not defeat, the goal of public access” 
(1987:9).  As cases such as Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston Inc (1995) show, the right to speak also includes the right to decide “what not to say” 
(1995:573).  In this instance, this meant that the organisers of a St Patrick’s Day Parade could 
prevent the attendance of a gay rights group, on the grounds that they did not want the public 
to believe that the group’s message may have originated with the event organisers.  This is 
the principle, as Netanel states, that “the government may not compel speech that suggests 
affirmance of a belief with which the speaker disagrees” (2008:51).  However, Netanel 
argues that this should not extend to the ability of musicians (and others) to be able to prevent 
the use of their work in events with which the musician disagrees (2008:51).  Netanel makes 
the example of Nazi band White Pride playing a cover of “Won’t Get Fooled Again”, 
suggesting that the playing of this cover by White Pride would not lead the public to 
conclude that Pete Townshend is a Nazi sympathiser (2008:52).  Nevertheless, these are 
ultimately issues of endorsement, or false endorsement, rather than of copyright and 
copyright infringement.  If a legal action were to be brought by the artist or publisher, it 
would likely be brought on the grounds of false endorsement, or freedom of association, 
rather than on copyright infringement grounds.  However, through the use of decentred self-
regulatory regimes such as that of notice and takedown, the removal of such content can be 
more easily achieved by making a request to a content hosting service, rather than having to 
bring an action to the courts and seek injunction.  If the content is removed to avoid 
appearing to endorse a political campaign through the use of a notice and takedown request, 
then copyright law, intended for the encouragement of the dissemination of information, is 
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being used to suppress information.  By treating copyright as property, and allowing for the 
right-holder to control it as if it were property, then this allows for the suppression of speech, 
both by musicians interested in avoiding association with certain politicians, but also 
potentially by others intent on derailing an opponent’s political campaign.  As Patterson 
states, in the US fair use operates as a “free-floating doctrine of equitable reason” (1987:40).  
However, if a decentred enforcement system outwith state control ultimately precludes 
analysis of fair use, then the potential for inequitable results, and indeed censorship through 
copyright, is substantially increased. 
 
Conclusions 
What conclusions can be drawn from this analysis?  While neoliberal theory would dictate 
that the number of regulatory institutions and the volume of regulation would decrease 
through the application of neoliberal policies, the reality has been that regulatory mechanisms 
have increased in number.  However, in line with neoliberal theory, these regulatory 
institutions are self-regulatory private corporations, largely able to dictate the terms of their 
own regulation.  Furthermore, the adoption of neoliberal conceptions of property in the field 
of copyright allows for the treatment of information as an absolute form of property.  As the 
self-regulatory institutions with the ability to remove content from the Internet are under the 
obligation to remove material that infringes copyright, parties wishing to suppress 
information are able to do so through the targeting of the Internet intermediaries.  As Seltzer 
argues, service providers act as effective chokepoints because laws such as the DMCA and E-
commerce Directive shift incentives towards takedown (Seltzer 2011:4).  In the environment 
fostered by regulatory capitalism, in which the ability to regulate is delegated and 
decentralised, copyright enforcement becomes diffused, operating through networks of actors.  
Because it takes the form of self-regulation, an approach encouraged within neoliberal theory, 
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ultimately the decision to remove embarrassing content perceived to infringe copyright is 
taken by a private entity.  As has been demonstrated, this means that the ability to censor is 
not one held solely by the state; we have seen that the state can exert indirect influence 
through a network upon a content host, resulting in removal on the basis of copyright 
infringement rather than direct state censorship.  We have seen private actors use takedown 
requests to remove embarrassing content hosted by a private content host in a way that limits 
the ability to raise a public interest fair use defence.  Finally, we have seen numerous private 
actors use takedown requests based in discourse of property protection that can have the 
potential effect of suppressing campaigns of those running for public office.  This 
demonstrates that this form of regulation is not vertical, but multilateral, and both state and 
non-state actors can exert this influence through a nodal relationship – however, in all cases, 
the decision is made through a self-regulatory mechanism, and one that fits effectively into 
the general theory of regulatory capitalism.  It has been argued that it is wrong to think of 
neoliberalism as pitting state against market, and that in effect their goals may be aligned – 
the same may well be said for internet regulation generally, and copyright enforcement 
specifically. 
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